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This paper applies operads and functorial semantics to address the problem of failure diagnosis in
complex systems. We start with a concrete example, developing a hierarchical interaction model for
the Length Scale Interferometer, a high-precision measurement system operated by the US National
Institute of Standards and Technology. Themodel is expressed in terms of combinatorial/diagrammatic
structures called port-graphs, and we explain how to extract an operad LSI from a collection of these
diagrams. Next we show how functors to the operad of probabilities organize and constrain the rel-
ative probabilities of component failure in the system. Finally, we show how to extend the analysis
from general component failure to specific failure modes.
1 Introduction
Hierarchical systems are ubiquitous in nature, in engineering and in commerce. We draw trees to rep-
resent anatomic features, component breakdowns and command structures. Hierarchies use abstraction
barriers and separation of concerns to analyze and simplify complex problems into manageable parts.
However, to represent a system as a tree involves abstracting away the interactions between its
branches. An alternative viewpoint, exemplified by models called port-graphs, emphasizes the leaves
of the tree (components) and the way that they are wired together to form a larger system. This ad-
ditional information is critical for system analysis, but such diagrams quickly become unwieldy as the
number of components grows.
Operads provide a nice mathematical formalism for interpolating between these two viewpoints. Our
goal in this paper is to demonstrate, in concrete terms, the use of operads to organize both qualitative and
quantitative descriptions of hierarchical systems. To that end, we begin by modeling a specific real-world
system, the Length Scale Interferometer (LSI), a device for precise length calibration operated by the US
National Institute for Standards and Technology.
We begin with a brief sketch of the LSI, its purpose and its design, followed by an informal review
of operads. Next, we construct a specific operad LSI based on the architecture of the LSI system and
expressed in terms of combinatorial/diagrammatic structures called port-graphs. This forms the basis for
a functorial analysis of failure diagnosis. First, we can consider the relative probabilities of component
and sub-component failure as a functor LSI→ Prob. Finally, we show how to integrate component level
probabilities with more specific information about specific failure modes.
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2 The Length Scale Interferometer
The Length Scale Interferometer (LSI) [1] is a precision length-measurement system operated by the US
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). Customers from around the world send length
scales, marked plates or rods ranging in size from a millimeter to a meter, to be calibrated at NIST’s
Gaithersburg, MD campus. Using laser interferometry, the device accurately measures lengths to better
than one part in one million (0.7 µm error across a one meter length), and can resolve markings on a
scale down to 0.1 µm.
More formally, a nominal length scale is defined by two distances: the total span D and the spacing
d, where N = D
d
∈N; for example, a typical meter stick with millimeter hatch marks would have D = 1 m
and d = 1 mm. The scale has N + 1 hatch marks located a 0,d,2d, . . .Nd = D. For a real scale we can
set our frame of reference Y by the first mark on the scale, but each of the others will exhibit an error εi,
and the purpose of the LSI system is to identify these errors.
The basic idea is simple enough. The scale is installed on a movable chassis, which also contains
one mirror of an interferometer. The length of the laser’s path changes as the scale and chassis move,
allowing us to infer the scale’s position from the fringe count of the interferometer.
A calibration starts from the initial mark at y0 = 0 and records the current fringe count f0 on the
interferometer’s readout. The machine scans to the next hatch mark y1, identified by an optical system,
and locks the position of the chassis. The new fringe reading f1, along with the laser’s wavelength λ0
and the index of refraction n, determines the associated error
y1 = d + ε1 = λ0 ·n · ( f1− f0).
We do the same for each of the rest of the marks, noting that all distances and errors are calculated
relative to y0 (rather than yi−1).
In practice, there are a number of complications, of which the most significant involve unavoidable
fluctuations in the environment. Here we are concerned with two main effects. First, the index of
refraction, which we use to calculate lengths and errors, depends on temperature.1 Second, thermal
expansion means that the relative positioning of system elements changes over time.
For example, the relative separation between (the first hatch mark of) the scale and the chassis’ mirror
will vary due to expansion of the metal that connects them. Similarly, the scale itself expands, so that the
positions of the hatch marks and their errors will vary. Consequently, we should reformulate the goal of
the LSI as measuring length scales at a standard temperature of 20 ◦C.
This variation has two practical implications for the LSI system. First, we must apply temperature-
dependent corrections to the gross measurements of the system (fringe counts). This is necessary both
to calculate the true lengths that were measured and to convert from these to the desired (temperature-
corrected) values. Second, in order to minimize correction error, the LSI must maintain environmental
values as close to the target as possible; to obtain the 0.7 µm accuracy mentioned above, the system must
operate within .02 ◦C of the target value.
3 Operads
A (colored) operad is a mathematical structure for representing hierarchical (tree-structured) composition
and decomposition. The fundamental element of an operad is an operation f ; every operation has an arity
1 The index of refraction also depends on pressure and humidity, but we ignore these in the interest of simplicity.
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Figure 1: A schematic decomposition of the LSI’s temperature regulation system.
m, a tuple of input objects Y1, . . . ,Ym and a single output object X , which we usually indicate by writing
α : Y1, . . . ,Ym → X (or more compactly, 〈Yi〉 → X ). When the input elements are not relevant, we may
simply write f : X
Given additional operations gi :Yi, operadic composition substitutes these for the “dummy variables”
Yi to obtain a new operation f (g1, . . . ,gm) (or f 〈gi〉). If each gi has mi inputs, then the new composite
has ∑i mi. Operadic associativity guarantees a well-defined composite for more deeply nested terms.
When it is unambiguous we may also write f (g) for composition along a single branch, rather than
f (id, . . . ,g, . . . , id). See [2] for a careful exposition.
We will be interested in a typed variant of Spivak’s operad of wiring diagrams [3]. We begin with a
set of interfaces I , which represent all the channels of interaction that occur within our system. These
include both physical interactions (heat flow)) and digital signals (temp measurements). Formally, we
specify I at the outset, although in practice it can be inferred from usage in system diagrams.
Given I , a boundary is a set of ports P together with a map (often left implicit) P → I . We draw
an interface as a box with |P|-many terminals, each labeled by a type (distinguished, if necessary, by
subscripts). For example, the bath used in the LSI’s temperature regulation system has a boundary
Bath
heat
setPtH2O
.
This indicates that the bath has three main interactions: heat flow to the length measurement en-
closure, chilled water provided from an outside system and a data stream that modifies the set point of
an internal heating controller. For now our labels are just place-holders, but they will be refined as we
elaborate the model.
In the PortGraph operad, an operation α : 〈Qi〉→P is a system architecture, modeled as a port-graph,
in which Qi are sub-component boundaries and P is an external system boundary. The ports in P and Qi
can be connected via wires, which are also typed, and more properly described as “hyper-wires” given
that a single wire can connect more than two ports.
For example the LSI’s temperature control system, shown in Figure 1, has three subsystems: one
controls the ambient lab temperature (±0.2 ◦C), another measures the internal temperature of the mea-
surement enclosure (±.005 ◦C) and a third manages the chilled water bath used to control the system’s
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temperature.
Physically, the bath and the lab environment both impact the enclosure through heat flow and this, in
turn, affects the length measurement subsystem via refraction of the laser. Another physical input to the
system, a chilled water source, is a shared resource controlled outside of the lab.
There are also digital flows involved in the system. Two streams of temperature data are produced
by the lab and the enclosure. There is also a control interaction, with a variable set point for a heating
element in the bath. Diagrammatically, it can be useful to distinguish between physical and informational
flows; for example, the latter have only indirect effects on the temperature of the system, in contrast to
the physical inputs. Formally, the use of different notations for different interaction types can be justified
by “typing the types” via a function I →{physical,digital}.
We can succinctly represent a port-graph architecture α as a zig-zag of functions, two of which
commute over types:
C Qoo //

❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅ W

Poo
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
I
(1)
Here C = comp(α) ∼= {1, . . . ,n} is the set of (black-box) components in the architecture, Q =
∏
i Qi is
the set of internal ports, W is the set of wires and P is the set of external ports. Both ports and wires are
typed, and the resulting triangles should commute.
Operadic composition acts by substituting one architecture into another. For example, Figure 2 shows
the result of substituting a lower-level architecture composed of a mixer, a resevoir and a heater for the
Bath component from Figure 1.
In the general case we may substitute for all Qi simultaneously, so suppose that we have a decompo-
sition (suppressing types) Di ← Ri →Vi ← Qi for each top-level component i ∈C. Clearly the external
ports P are unchanged by substitution inside Qi. The set of internal boundaries is given by D =
∏
i Di;
similarly the internal ports of the architecture will be R =
∏
i Ri.
Finally, we can compute the wire set for the aggregate by identifying an outer wire w with an inner
wire vi whenever they share an intermediate port Qi. Formally, this corresponds to a pushout, and typing
on the new wires exists by virtue of the associated mapping property:
V +
Q
W
∏
i Di
∏
i Ri
oo // ∏
iVi
;;✈✈✈✈
W
bb❉❉❉
Poo
∏
i Qi
;;✈✈✈✈✈
ee❑❑❑❑
(2)
Equations 1 and 2 (along with the set I ) define an operad PortGraph.
One nice feature of operads is that, although they allow us to represent hierarchical information, they
do not constrain us to work within a single hierarchy. In particular, different perspectives often suggest
different decompositions for a system, and we can make sense of these distinctions using equations in
the operad.
An example is shown in Figure 3. On one hand we can decompose the LSI system functionally (blue
boundaries), separating the elements involved in length measurement from those used for temperature
control. The second shows a more generic, control-theoretic perspective (red boundaries), separating
out components that produce observations (sensors) from those which modify the state of the system
(actuators). We could also consider a “geographic” decomposition based on the physical access to the
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Figure 2: An operadic composition τ(β ) for two architectures τ : Bath,Lab,Box → TempSys and
β : Mixer,Resevoir,Heater→ Bath.
components (e.g., inside/outside the system enclosure). An equation in the PortGraph operad indicates
that two incompatible hierarchies (e.g., function vs. control) have a common refinement at a lower level
of abstraction.
On first encounter, it can be easy to mix up port graph diagrams, which represent specific archi-
tectures, with the PortGraph operad, which represents all possible architectures. A specific system,
as represented by a collection of diagrams, can be compiled into a “sub-operad” (faithful functor)
LSI⊆ PortGraph involving only the boundaries and architectures that appear in our diagrams.2 A com-
plete description of the LSI operad, compiled from Figures 1, 2 and 3, is given in the Appendix, Tables 3
& 4.
4 Component failure
In the last section we constructed an operad LSI whose operations are hierarchically organized architec-
tures of the Length Scale Interferometer. Once we have laid out the architecture of the system, we can
use it to structure system analyses.
The general principle of functorial semantics is that a model can be regarded as a mapping (called a
functor) from architectural (syntactic) elements to computational (semantic) ones, but that this mapping
must be assigned in a way that respects the compositional structure of the syntax. Probability provides a
good example.
A very simple model of component failure might conclude, based on historical data, that a failure in
the LSI will be located in the temperature regulation subsystem 60% of the time, and in the length mea-
surement subsystem the remaining 40% of the time. The probability distribution p = (ls 7→ 40%, ts 7→
60%) is itself an operation in an operad, and we can think of the failure model as a mapping from the
functional architecture ϕ to the distribution p.
Suppose, moreover, that we also know the probabilities of failures within the temperature regulation
system, which can involve the bath (ba 7→ 80%), the lab temperature system (lb 7→ 10%) or enclosure
(box) temperature measurement system (bx 7→ 10%). Relative probabilities compose by multiplication
2However, note that diagrams with nested interfaces encode multiple architectures; six operations (ϕ , λ , τ , κ , σ and α) and
an equation can be extracted from the single diagram in Figure 3.
S. Breiner, B. Pollard, E. Subrahmanian & O. Marie-Rose 77
Functional Decomposition Control Decomposition
Lab
Box
BathChassis
Optics
Intfr
TempSysLengthSys
LSI
ϕ


λ




τ
Lab
Box Optics
Intfr
Chassis Bath
Sensors Actuators
LSI
κ


σ




α
Operad Equation: ϕ(λ ,τ) = κ(σ ,α)
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Figure 3: Operad equations represent common refinements between distinct hierarchies.
(conditioning), so that given a fault somewhere in the LSI, there is a 80%× 60% = 48% chance that
it involves the bath. This is an instance of functoriality: composite architectures map to composite
distributions.
More precisely, there is an operad of probabilities called Prob. Prob is a “plain” operad, so that
each operation has a fixed number of inputs (arity) m (in contrast to PortGraph, where each operation
LSI Component Failure Model
ϕ(ls, ts)
ls 7→ 40%
κ(sn,ac)
sn 7→ 28%
ts 7→ 60% ac 7→ 72%
λ (in,op,ch)
in 7→ 10%
σ(lb,bt,op, in)
lb 7→ 21.4%
op 7→ 30% bt 7→ 21.4%
ch 7→ 60% op 7→ 42.9%
τ(ba,bx, lb)
ba 7→ 80% in 7→ 14.3%
bx 7→ 10%
α(ch,ba)
ch 7→ 33.3%
lb 7→ 10% ba 7→ 66.7%
β (ht,mx,rs)
ht 7→ 50%
mx 7→ 30%
rs 7→ 20%
Table 1: A probabilistic model of component failure presented as an operad functor LSI→ Prob.
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pi has a “shape” 〈Qi〉 → P). An operation Prob is just a finite probability distribution p = 〈i 7→ pi〉i<m,
and its arity is the size of the index set m. The operadic (tree-structured) composition of p with m-many
additional distributions qi = 〈 j 7→ qi j〉 j<mi is defined by
p(q1, . . . ,qn) =
〈
(i, j) 7→ pi ·qi j
〉
, (3)
where the index set is the collection of pairs (i < m, j < mi).
This allows us to think of the simple failure model described above as a functor P : LSI→ Prob. The
data associated with a specific instance is shown in Table 1. It sends each architecture Q1, . . . ,Qm → P
to a probability distribution on m elements, which should be interpreted as the relative probability of a
failure in Qi, given a failure in P.
In order to define a functor, these probability assignments should satisfy the LSI’s composition equa-
tion (Figure 3). This defines some global constraints on how probability can be apportioned between
different systems. For example, from above we know that there 80%×60% = 48% chance that a given
failure occurs in the Bath. If we also know that problems with actuators are responsible for 72% of all
faults in the LSI (κ : ac 7→ 72%), then we can infer that the bath is twice as likely to malfunction as the
chassis (third and fourth equations of Table 2). All in all, the LSI’s coherence equation ϕ(λ ,τ) = κ(σ ,α)
generates six probability equations, corresponding to the six components involved in the composed ar-
chitecture.
Even in the absence of data we can represent these equations symbolically–the top line corresponds to
ϕ(ls) ·λ (in) = κ(sn) ·σ(in)–and in this form we can view operadic coherence equations as data integrity
constraints or rules of inference.
5 Requirements and behavior
Though the operadic structure of the LSI model is useful for organizing failure probabilities, our analysis
so far is deficient in that it considers only the components that fail, and not what goes wrong with them.
In this section we consider more specific failure modes for the LSI, and their analysis using the classical
method of fault trees.
Failure modes are best understood in the context of requirements. For example, the key functional
requirement of the TempSys subsystem is that the laser’s temperature should stay within 0.02 degrees of
in : Intfr 7→
ϕ︷︸︸︷
40%×
λ︷︸︸︷
10% = 4% =
κ︷︸︸︷
28%×
σ︷ ︸︸ ︷
14.3%
op : Optics 7→ 40%×30% = 12% = 28%×42.9%
ch : Chassis 7→ 40%×60% = 24% = 72%×
α︷ ︸︸ ︷
33.3%
ba : Bath 7→ 60%×
τ︷︸︸︷
80% = 48% = 72%×66.7%
bt : Box 7→ 60%×10% = 6% = 28%×
σ︷ ︸︸ ︷
21.4%
rt : Lab 7→ 60%×10% = 6% = 28%×21.4%
Table 2: Functorial coherence equations induced by the equation ϕ(λ ,τ) = κ(α ,σ)
S. Breiner, B. Pollard, E. Subrahmanian & O. Marie-Rose 79
20 ◦C. Correspondingly, we have two failure modes
Tlaser < 19.98
◦C, 20.02 ◦C< Tlaser. (4)
In a similar fashion, we can associate a set of failure modes Err(P)with each boundary P∈ LSI. Typically
these should reference features of the associated boundary (i.e., laser is an element of the boundary
TempSys).
If Tlaser is low, this may happen for a number of reasons. Either the Bath or the ambient Lab might
be too cold, or the insulation of the Box might be leaking. However, we can say with confidence that a
high Bath temperature is not the cause. For each failure mode at the lower level we ask whether or not it
can lead to a high temp on laser. Repeating this procedure for each high-level failure, the “can cause”
relation defines a functor M : LSI→ Rel+.
Here Rel+ is an operad of relations, in which the objects are sets, and an arrow 〈Yi〉 → X is a relation
R ⊆
(
∏
i
Xi
)
×Y ∼= ∏
i
(Xi×Y ) ,
or, equivalently, a family of relations Ri ⊆ Xi×Y . With the usual composition of relations, functoriality
asserts the transitivity of causation: if a malfunctioning heater can cause a cold bath, and a cold bath can
cause a low laser temp, then a malfunctioning heater can cause a low laser temp.
6 Synthesizing semantics
Intuitively, there should be some relationship between the failure probabilities from section 4 and the
failure modes of the last section. At a minimum, if some component Yi does not cause any errors in X ,
then the associated probability should be zero. In this section we formalize this relationship functorially,
as a joint lifting of P and M:
LSI
P
||①①
①①
①①
①①
M
""❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊

✤
✤
✤
Prob •oo❴ ❴ ❴ //❴❴❴ Rel+
(5)
Given sets X and Y , a (stochastic) kernel p : X  Y is an X -indexed set of probability distributions
px :Y → [0,1]. We think of p as a stochastic mapping, which we emphasize by writing px(y) = p(x 7→ y).
There is a category Stoch in which the objects are sets and two kernels p : X Y and q :Y  Z compose
by marginalization:
p.q : (x 7→ z) 7−→ ∑
y∈Y
p(x 7→ y) ·q(y 7→ z).
Using essentially the same technique we can construct an operad Stoch+ in which an arrow p : 〈Yi〉 → X
is a kernel X  
∏
iYi.
Every kernel defines a relation—its support {(x,y) | p(x 7→ y) > 0}—providing a functor supp :
Stoch+ → Rel+. However, Stoch+ is not good enough to provide a joint lifting, as it does not provide
a functor to Prob. In Bayesian terms, a kernel represents a conditional probability, and to generate an
absolute probability we need to combine this with a prior.
A single distribution over X can be represented as a kernel r : 1 X , also called a point in Stoch.
There is a category Pt(Stoch) in which the objects are pairs 〈X ,r〉 and an arrow 〈Y,s〉→ 〈X ,r〉 is a kernel
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p :Y  X forming a commutative triangle
1
s

?
?
?
?
r

_
_
_
_
Y
p
///o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o X
(6)
Again, we can use coproducts to define an associated operad Pt(Stoch)+. As above, an arrow
〈Yi,si〉 → 〈X ,r〉 is a kernel p : X  
∏
iYi, yielding a forgetful functor forget : Pt(Stoch)
+ → Stoch+.
However, the commutativity condition (6) must be tweaked to accommodate operations with higher ar-
ity:
1
r

O
O
O
r ///o/o/o X
p
///o/o/o ∏
iYi
i // ∏
i1
∼= n
∏
i si

O
O
O
X
p
///o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o ∏
iYi.
(7)
The lower path r.p weights the kernel p by the prior r. The upper path marginalizes r.p to obtain a
distribution on the indices i ∈ n, and uses this to weight the prior distributions over Yi. Moreover, the
top row in (7) defines a functor aggr : Pt(Stoch)+ → Prob sending a kernel p : 〈Yi,si〉 → 〈X ,r〉 to the
aggregate distribution |p| shown below:3
1
|p|
///o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o
r

^
^
^
^
n
X
p
///o/o/o ∏
iYi
i
==⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤⑤
.
(8)
This realizes our goal for the section. A synthesis of the probabilistic models from section 4 and the
possibilistic failure modes of section 5 can be modeled as a joint lifting S : LSI→ Pt(Stoch)+:
LSI
P
uu❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥
S

M
))❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚
Prob Pt(Stoch)+
forget
//
aggr
oo Stoch+
supp
// Rel
+
(9)
3The following diagram shows that such kernels are closed under composition:
1
r

O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
|p|
##
#c
#c
#c
#c
#c
#c
r ///o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o X
p

O
O
O
n ∼=
∏
i 1
∏
i si

O
O
O
∏
i si ///o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o
∏
i |qi|
***j
*j*j
*j*j
*j*j
*j*j
*j*j
∏
i Yi
∏
i qi

O
O
O
X
p
///o/o/o/o ∏
iYi ∏
i qi
///o/o/o/o ∏
i j Zi j ∏
i j
// ∏
i mi
∼=
∏
i j 1 ∏
i j γi j
///o/o/o ∏
i j Zi j
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7 Conclusion
We close by noting, briefly, some limitations of the present paper. Though our model is based on a real-
world system, it is much too coarse to use in practice. A true predictive model would require a much
more detailed decomposition of the system. Similarly, the failure model presented in Section 4 is not
based on real data, but rather selected to illustrate certain points. However, we intend to refine the model
over time and, eventually, hope to produce a reference implementation for categorical systems modeling.
Second, the models presented here are purely static, but it would be preferable to incorporate sensor
observations into our failure predictions. Here we should be able to leverage existing work on the in-
terpretation of port-graphs as behavioral constraints on dynamical systems. Our next goal is to develop
a dynamical model of system and component behaviors including both functioning and malfunctioning
components. By substituting malfunctioning component models into the larger dynamical system, we
can estimate the likely sensor readings for each failure mode and use these to assess the relativized failure
probabilities discussed in Section 5.
Disclaimer: Commercial products are identified in this article to adequately specify the material. This does not imply recom-
mendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor does it imply the materials identified are
necessarily the best available for the purpose.
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Appendix
The appendix collects an explicit description of the LSI operad discussed throughout the paper. Interface
types and boundaries are shown in Table 3. Operations, along with combinatorial descriptions of the
associated port-graph architectures, and an equation are shown in Table 4.
LSI System Boundaries
Boundary Ports
Intfr laser,fringe
Chassis laser,focus,drive
Optics focus,intensity
Bath heat,H2O,setPt
Box heat1,heat2,laser,temp
Lab heat,temp
Mixer mix
Resevoir heat1,heat2,mix,H2O
Heater setPt,heat
TempSys laser,H2O,temp1,temp2,setPt
LengthSys laser,intensity,fringe,drive
Sensors intensity,fringe,temp1,temp2,
focus,heat,laser
Actuators H2O,drive,setPt,focus,heat,laser
LSI H2O,intensity,fringe,temp1,
temp2,setPt,drive
I =
{
heat,laser,H2O,focus,mix,temp,
fringe,intensity,drive,setPt
}
Table 3: Objects and types for the LSI system operad, compiled from Figures 1, 2 and 3.
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ϕ : (ls : LengthSys, ts : TempSys)−→ LSI
ℓ.laser= t.laser
λ : (in : Intfr,op : Optics,ch : Chassis)−→ LengthSys
ch.focus= op.focus
ch.laser= in.laser
τ : (ba : Bath,bt : Box,rt : Lab)−→ TempSys
bt.heat1 = ba.heat
bt.heat2 = rt.heat
κ : (sn : Sensors,ac : Actuators)−→ LSI
s.heat= a.heat
s.laser= a.laser
s.focus= a.focus
σ : (rt : Lab,bt : Box,op : Optics, ls : Intfr)−→ LengthSys
bt.heat2 = rt.heat
bt.laser= ls.laser
α : (ch : Chassis,ba : Bath)−→ Actuators
No equations
β : (ht : Heater,mx : Mixer,rs : Resevoir)−→ Bath
rs.mix = mx.mix
rs.heat2 = ht.heat
Architectural Coherence Equation
ϕ(λ ,τ) = κ(σ ,α)
Table 4: Architectures (operations) from the LSI system operad. Each architecture can be described as
a set of equations between component ports. The architectural coherence equation corresponds to the
diagram in Figure 3.
